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THE CONTINUED RENAISSANCE OF COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Ran Hirschl*
Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg & James Melton, The Endurance ofNational
Constitutions (Cambridge U. Press 2009). Pp. 270. $88.99.
Vicki Jackson, ConstitutionalEngagement in a TransnationalEra (Oxford U. Press

2010). Pp. 536. $68.00.
The past two decades have witnessed a sharp comparative turn in legal practice
and scholarship. Centripetal processes of global convergence, transnational governance,
and complex economic interdependence aided by the development of new
communication and information technologies have all contributed towards making the
legal profession more international in scope than it has ever been before. The everexpanding interest among practitioners, scholars, and policy makers in the laws and legal
institutions of other countries is remarkable. "We are all comparativists now" has
increasingly become the motto of many jurists and legal scholars worldwide. This new
interest is particularly striking in comparative constitutional law and the transnational
migration of constitutional ideas. There is no doubt that the systematic study of
constitutional law, jurisprudence, and institutions across polities has enjoyed a certain
renaissance since the mid-1980s. From a relatively obscure and exotic subject studied by
the devoted few, comparative constitutionalism has emerged as one of the more
fashionable subjects in contemporary legal scholarship, with ever-closer ties to
comparative politics, law and society, and empirical legal studies.
Over 150 countries as well as several supra national entities (e.g., the European
Union) covering approximately three quarters of the world's population have gone
through major constitutionalization processes over the last few decades. Most of these
countries have introduced a bill of rights and have established some form of active
judicial review. Meanwhile, various transnational rights regimes, most notably the
emerging pan-European rights regime based on the European Convention of Human
Rights and enforced by the European Court of Human Rights ("ECtHR"), have
transformed rights jurisprudence and the practice of judicial review in all their member
states. The constitutions of an increasing number of countries in other continents require
judges to consider international law in interpreting their bill of rights. As a result,
constitutional courts worldwide increasingly rely on comparative constitutional law to
frame and articulate their own position on a given constitutional question. This has
brought about "a brisk international traffic in ideas about rights," carried on through
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advanced information technologies by high court judges from different countries. 1
Indeed, "constitution interpretation across the globe is taking on an increasingly
cosmopolitan character, as comparative jurisprudence comes to assume a central place in
constitutional adjudication."2 An international epistemic community of jurists has
emerged. In short, "[c]ourts are talking to one another all over the world." 3 Even the U.S.
Supreme Court
one of the last bastions of resistance among the world's leading
constitutional courts - has hesitantly joined the comparative reference trend.4
Another manifestation of the global convergence of constitutional law and
jurisprudence is the emergence of what may be termed "generic constitutional law" - a
supposedly universal, Esperanto-like discourse of constitutional adjudication and
reasoning, primarily in the context of core civil rights and liberties. 5 This has been
accompanied by the rise of "proportionality" as the prevalent interpretive method in
comparative constitutional adjudication.6 This interpretive method commonly drawn
upon throughout the world of new constitutionalism is based on judicious, pragmatic
balancing of competing claims, rights, and policy considerations, as opposed to various
more principled (at least at the declarative level) approaches to constitutional
interpretation commonly used in the United States.
These global trends and the corresponding demand among students and jurists
alike for quality teaching and scholarship in the field have not gone unnoticed in legal
scholarship. Scholarly books and monographs dealing with comparative constitutional
law are no longer considered a rarity. Entire textbooks, even research guides and
handbooks, are now devoted exclusively to comparative constitutional law, or draw upon
selected comparative constitutional jurisprudence to highlight distinct characteristics of
American constitutional law. More edited collections than ever before deal with various
aspects of constitutionalism beyond the United States. New periodicals (e.g.,
InternationalJournal of Constitutional Law) and symposia are devoted to the study of

comparative constitutional law as a distinct phenomenology and field of inquiry. Topranked law schools in the United States and elsewhere now regard courses on
comparative constitutional law as essential additions to the curriculum. While certain
foundational, ontological, epistemological, and methodological questions concerning the
field's purpose, scope, and nature remain largely unanswered, there is no doubt that this
is the heyday for scholars of comparative constitutional law and politics.

* Professor of Political Science & Law and Canada Research Chair in Constitutionalism & Democracy,
University of Toronto.
1. Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of PoliticalDiscourse 158 (Free Press 1991).
2. Sujit Choudhry, Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of Comparative
ConstitutionalInterpretation, 74 Ind. L.J. 819, 820 (1999).
3. Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of TransiudicialCommunication, 29 U. Rich. L. Rev. 99 (1994).
4. See e.g. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575-578 (2005); Lawrence v. Tex., 539 U.S. 558, 573, 576-

577 (2003). In Atkins v. Virginia, the majority opinion referred to an amicus brief by the European Union. 536
U.S. 304, 316-317 n. 21 (2002).
5. David Law, Generic ConstitutionalLaw, 89 Minn. L. Rev. 652, 659 (2005). See also Jiunn- Rong Yeh
& Wen-Chen Chang, The Emergence of Transnational Constitutionalism: Its Features, Challenges and

Solutions, 27 Penn. St. Intl. L. Rev. 89 (2008).
6. David Beatty, The Ultimate Rule of Law 159-160 (Oxford U. Press 2004). See also Aharon Barak,
Purposive Interpretationin Law (Princeton U. Press 2005); Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Mathews, Proportionality
Balancingand Global Constitutionalism, 47 Colum. J. Transnatl. L. 73 (2008).
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This transformation serves as the springboard for Professor Jackson's
7
exceptionally erudite book ConstitutionalEngagement in a TransnationalEra. Jackson
is one of the most prominent cosmopolitan voices in American constitutional
scholarship. Very few people in North America, or indeed anywhere else, can lay
credible claims for being more knowledgeable with respect to both American and
comparative constitutional law matters. These rare qualities are reflected in every page of
her book, which in many ways marks the culmination of Professor Jackson's decadeslong exploration of the "love-hate" relationship between engrained particularist legacies
and overarching universalist values in American constitutional law. It is an exceptionally
rich, at times even overly dense, book that engages in both empirical exploration and
normative prescription. At the investigative level, Jackson provides useful vocabulary
and ample illustrations for understanding the various domestic constitutional reactions to
transnational law, and then meticulously explores how transnational law treaties,
customary international law, the decisions of foreign or international tribunals, and other
transnational legal influences affect constitutional interpretation and adjudication. At
the prescriptive level, she advances a cosmopolitan agenda that endorses wider
engagement with transnational law for both pragmatic and principled reasons.
At the book's core is the notion that constitutional law in the United States and
elsewhere now operates in an increasingly transnational legal environment of
international treaties and supranational human rights, trade, and monetary regimes. 8 As
many have observed, in our changing world, every issue has become global, whether it is
health, finance, security, or, yes, constitutional law. There are very few truly domestic
issues any more. It is thus unrealistic, and indeed unwise, to assume that constitutional
law in general, and the strangely insular American constitutional law in particular, may
continue to defy universalism in favor of particularism. Constitutional courts
commonly thought of as the guardians of the nation's constitutional legacy and enduring
values ought to adjust and are adjusting, in some places admittedly faster than in
others.
Jackson moves confidently from identifying various ways in which transnational
law affects constitutional jurisprudence to drawing analogies, distinctions, and contrasts
between American constitutional issues and pertinent constitutional adjudication of
various other countries. The bulk of the book engages in comparative work from an
American standpoint, as a tool for self-reflection or self-betterment through analogy,
distinction, and contrast. The underlying assumption here is that by referring to the
constitutional jurisprudence and practices of other, presumably similarly situated polities,
scholars and jurists might be able to gain a better understanding of the set of
constitutional values and structures in their own sets of constitutional values.
Accordingly, there is a bit of an "American in Paris" undercurrent to some of
Jackson's analyses of foreign law (much like the way Canada, my own home country, is
often portrayed by American progressives as an all-out social justice paradise and true
antithesis to American conservatism). But on the whole, Jackson is an excellent
constitutional sojourner. Most of her comparative examples come from countries that are
7. Vicki Jackson, ConstitutionalEngagement in a TransnationalEra (Oxford U. Press 2010).

8. Id. at 1.
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now considered the "usual suspects" in such analyses (Canada, South Africa, Germany
and, India), although there is a fair bit of reference to less frequently travelled
constitutional destinations as well. Little attention is given to constitutional law in the
non-liberal democratic world, but that is quite understandable given the nature of
Jackson's project as well as the liberal overtone of global constitutionalism. She speaks
with authority about a wide array of issues, ranging from interpretive methods to
reproductive freedoms, and from the laws of federalism to gender equality. Jackson
correctly notes that rights issues are more conducive to a meaningful transnational
conversation and collective enrichment than other core constitutional issues such as
federalism or the incorporation of international treaties. 9 Her mastery of comparative
case law is beyond impressive, even if - as I think Jackson herself would readily admit most of the discussion of foreign case law probably will not be considered novel by
constitutional scholars in each of the cases' "country of origin." But by that harsh
criterion, 99% of comparative jurisprudence analyses, let alone hundreds of U.S
Supreme Court case commentaries published each year, would not get an A+ for
"novelty by local standards" either. The bottom line is that the "whole" of Jackson's book
is greater than the sum of its parts, although the sheer sum of the book's parts, over 500
pages of exhaustive analyses of comparative constitutional cases, ideas, and practices, is
in itself more than worth the admission ticket.
From an empirical standpoint, Jackson's claim that the changing nature of
constitutional law in these transnational times and the inevitability of such changes is
fully persuasive. Likewise, her argument that engagement with foreign constitutional
jurisprudence may enlighten and enrich domestic constitutional discourse with respect to
a host of concrete issues makes perfect sense. The strength of Jackson's broad
cosmopolitan premise depends on one's own position with respect to these trends, or
indeed the very framing of "transnationalism" or "globalization." The political left often
shares an agnostic view of globalization processes. Yet in the constitutional arena, global
convergence and interjurisdictional cross-fertilization are more often than not supported
by liberal-progressive scholars.
Constantly hovering over and feeding into Jackson's book is the heated debate in
the United States Supreme Court and in American legal academia more generally about
reference to foreign constitutional case law and principles, and more generally adherence
to international tribunals, customary, and treaty-based international law norms. Of the
several arguments advanced by those opposed to constitutional borrowing, of whom
Justice Antonin Scalia is the best known, the two that carry the most weight in the
context of Jackson's book are, first, that there are serious methodological problems in
reference to foreign cases, for example, problems of "cherry-picking" favorable cases,
out-of-context analysis, and selective designation of relevant sources (why certain
countries but not others are considered legitimate sources to borrow from); and, second,
that reference to foreign constitutional jurisprudence amounts to little more than "social
progressiveness by stealth." 10 Because the rights jurisprudence of most other leading
democracies is more progressive than that of the United States, reference to these
9. Id. at ch. 7.
10. Id at ch. 6.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol45/iss4/19

4

2011]

Hirschl: The Continued
Renaissance of
Comparative Constitutional Law
RENAISSANCE
THE CONTINUED

775

countries' rulings advances, almost by definition, a more progressive line of
interpretation that in the context of the current culture wars in American society tends to
prefer views favored by, say, the Kennedy-Clinton circle over those of the Bush-Cheney
clan.
All pertinent arguments against borrowing reflect a view of American
constitutionalism as unique, exceptional, and particular, whereas the main arguments for
the practice are neatly aligned with a universal and cosmopolitan view of
constitutionalism and human experience more generally. Republicans and right-wingers
tend to resent borrowing; Democrats, liberals, and progressives tend to support it.
Moreover, the political split in the U.S. Supreme Court is closely aligned with the
Justices' positions on foreign reference. Most or all of the five Justices who voted against
a recount in the Bush v. Gore courtroom battle over the fate of the American presidency
(thereby paving George W. Bush's way to the White House) reject reference to foreign
judgments. Most or all of the Justices who voted for a recount (i.e., those who sided with
Al Gore's argument) tend to support, either tacitly or explicitly, reference to foreign
judgments. Much like other ostensibly principled interpretive debates that Jackson
refers to, the debate over reference to foreign law in the United States is portrayed as
analytical but is mainly political. It cannot be understood separately from the deep
culture wars that have characterized the American polity for decades and are
omnipresent in the American public sphere, from Michelle Obama to Laura Bush, from
Martha's Vineyard to Wyoming's ranches, and from PBS to Fox News. While from a
comparative jurisprudence angle Jackson's book is hands down a magnum opus, it takes
the sociopolitical context for the charged domestic-transnational encounters too lightly. 12
The Endurance of National Constitutions by Professors Elkins, Ginsburg, and
Melton 1 3 ("Melkinsburg") is more "political" than Jackson's book if admittedly less
passionately argued. Melkinsburg are men on a mission. Their goal: injecting new life
into the hitherto numb area of comparative constitutional design.14 Interest in
"constitutional engineering" peaked with the prolific consociational democracy literature
of the late 1970s, and then again in the early 1990s with the vibrant debates about
transition to and consolidation of democracy and free markets in post-authoritarian
settings. With the exception of debates on the externally promoted constitutionalization
in media hotspots such as Afghanistan (2004) or Iraq (2005), or a few powerful takes on
the shortcomings of American constitutional configuration, the field has been crying out
for new directions over the last fifteen years.15 Enter Melkinsburg.
At the core of this pioneering book - its core concept reflects what is arguably one
of the most intriguing new directions in comparative constitutional scholarship we have
11.Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
12. Two recent books that examine comparatively the often charged interaction between constitutional
aspirations and political realities are my own Ran Hirschl, Constitutional Theocracy (Harvard U. Press 2010)
and Gary Jacobsohn's ConstitutionalIdentity (Harvard U. Press 2010).
13. Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg & James Melton, The Endurance of National Constitutions (Cambridge

U. Press 2009) [hereinafter Metkinsburg].
14. Id atix.
15. See e.g. Robert A. Dahl, How Democratic Is the American Constitution? (2d ed., Yale U. Press 2002);
Sanford Levinson, Our Undemocratic Constitution: Where the Constitution Goes Wrong (and How We the
People Can Correct It) (Oxford U. Press 2006).
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seen in the last few years is the question, how can we explain the variance in the
lifespan of national constitutions, or, why is it that some national constitutions live much
longer than others.16 To answer this question, the authors draw on a comprehensive,
never-before-assembled dataset on the constitutions of the world from 1789 to 2005 a
mere 216 years of modem constitutionalism. 17 Melkinsburg provide a fair bit of stunning
news at the descriptive level. Ancillary powers, or even what is included in national
constitutions, vary tremendously across polities. So whereas constitutional theory assigns
certain tasks or functions to a constitution, the constitutions of the world diverge in
addressing these functions. While constitutions are written to last, the authors report,
they vary considerably in terms of their endurance.18 Some constitutions are relatively
long lived. In addition to the U.S. Constitution, Norway's constitution was adopted in
1814 and is the second oldest constitution currently in existence. Sweden's 1809
constitution was replaced in 1974, at the age of 165. The 1874 constitution of
Switzerland was replaced by a new one in 1999, at the age of 125. The life expectancy of
other constitutions is quite short. Melkinsburg find that only half of all constitutions last
more than nine years, with an overall average of below twenty years. Thus, the average
citizen outside of North America, they report, should expect to see her country cycle
through four constitutions in her lifetime.
Why the variance in constitutional endurance? Possible responses are grouped into
two main categories: "environmental" factors (as in non institutional, "software"-like
aspects, mainly the social, political, or economic context within which constitutions
operate), and "design" factors (matters of constitutional drafting and institutional
design). 19
Melkinsburg tend to emphasize the latter aspect; while extra constitutional factors
do affect a constitution's endurance, design choices (that reflect social, economic, and
political factors, to be sure) matter a greater deal, they argue. Their data supports the
significance of the "design" factor - this in itself is a major contribution to the
constitutional and institutional design literature, even if Melkinsburg do not treat the full
range of "environmental" factors with the same meticulousness as they treat quantifiable
design elements. They do acknowledge the significance of "environmental" factors such
as ethnic homogeneity/heterogeneity or a tradition of enduring constitutions. However,
these feed into the design process; the more heterogeneous a given polity's ethnic
makeup is, the greater the likelihood it will be addressed by constitutional framers.
Enduring constitutions emerge by virtue of a relatively open drafting stage (e.g.,
the inclusiveness of the constitutionalization process, acceptance by various
constituencies during the constitutional order's early years); tend to be specific (the
extent to which the design of a constitution is detailed); and more often than not are
adaptable (they have relatively flexible amending formulae and modernization
processes). These three design choices "result from the constitution-making process
itself, but are also features of ongoing practice. All three mutually reinforce each other to

16.
17.
18.
19.

Melkinsburg, supra n. 13, at 2.
Id. at ix.
See id. at 12-35.
Id. at 134-142.
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produce a vigorous constitutional politics in which groups have a stake in the survival of
the constitution." 20
Melkinsburg's analysis skillfully defies the annoying, non analytical tone that
often accompanies normative constitutional discourse. They treat their research subjects
(constitutions of the world) much like hospital triage doctors treat patients: with empathy
and urgency yet ultimately in a distant, composed fashion. Multivariate quantitative
analysis is drawn upon in several chapters, others are based on brief illustrative casestudies, old and new, trivial and exotic. The grasp of pertinent constitutional theory
arguments and political science literature is impressive. Perhaps most importantly, this
project, even if somewhat overly a-contextual and "non-ethnographic" at times (Clifford
Geertz's own life-expectancy would have certainly not increased had he read this book),
opens up an entire set of new research and constitutional drafting possibilities, notably
the possibility of a "scientific," perhaps even computerized, process of constitutional
design, macro (e.g., containing pressures in a multi-ethnic polity) or micro (e.g., what is
the most suitable judicial appointments strategy). 2 1 Not too many books can boast such a
new, potentially groundbreaking beginning.
All of this is not only a must-read to any serious student of constitutional design,
but is also conveyed in an unusually entertaining, witty fashion; this book is an enjoyable
read even if you are not into comparative constitutional law. One thought-provoking
insight follows a cool factoid-like bit of information. Amusing metaphors abound.
Melkinsburg identify "risks to constitutional life" (chapter 5) and provide "an
epidemiological analysis of constitutional mortality" (chapter 6).22 They talk about
"constitutional autopsies" (postmortem analyses of constitutional collapse); the
"Kawasaki Ninja" risk-factor (an extremely powerful sport motorcycle; the life
expectancy of a Ninja owner following the date of purchase is six months); and about
"the Goldilocks problem" (radically different readings on the dependent variable
resulting from minor changes in the independent variable).23 Elsewhere in the book, they
draw parallels between the life expectancy of constitutions and marriage (both symbolic,
covenant-like contracts) in several Western countries.24 The risk of divorce peaks at six
years of marriage before decreasing gradually; in the case of constitutions, the hazard
rate peaks at fifteen but then decreases steadily and substantially until by age fifty the
rate is approximately .02, or 20 deaths per 1,000 constitutions.25 Curiously, Melkinsburg
report, "not only does the shape of the hazard rate match across the two domains, but the
magnitude of the hazard rate itself is almost equivalent when both rates are at their
peak." 2 6
If there is a pertinent aspect of this project that Melkinsburg should probably have

20.
21.
in The
2010).
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. at 89.
On the possibility of "computerized" constitutional design, see for example David Law, Constitutions,
Oxford Handbook of EmpiricalLegal Research (Peter Cane & Herbert M. Kritzer eds., Oxford U. Press
Melkinsburg, supra n. 13, at ch. 5 & 6.
Id. at 124-125.
Id. at 131.
Id at 130-131.
Id at 131.
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considered more closely, it is the basic question of what counts as "success" in
constitutional design and to what extent a long lifespan is indeed a suitable criterion for
measuring it. To be sure, this omission is not exclusive to this book. Considering how
central the question of "success" and how to define and measure is, it has not been
thoroughly addressed in the canonical constitutional-design literature. Endurance may be
an intuitive standard by which to measure the relative success of a given constitution.
Akin to a reliable vehicle, the longer a given constitution is able to withstand the test of
time, the stronger the indication, so the argument may go, that it is a good or suitable
constitution. So by that criterion, the United States Constitution is a stunning success
story. But the continued existence of a constitution may reflect path-dependence factors
as well as the dominant ideological ambiance and constellations of power that are
conducive to its endurance.
The longest standing constitution is the U.S. Constitution, with several other
constitutions also surpassing or approaching their first centennial anniversary. But a
constitution is supposed to accomplish, or at least facilitate, the accomplishment of
substantive goals. Its endurance per se seems of secondary significance. The proof of its
success is in the pudding itself, not in its lifespan. There is also the problem of silence or
irrelevance. Older constitutions are not likely to provide adequate responses to new
challenges; old constitutions' oversight of say, the metropolis as a third order
government, may be attributed to the fact that massive urbanization and the emergence
of the mega-city is a phenomenon of the last 70 or 80 years.
Or think of it this way: what is the raison-d'treof a commercially grown plum? A
wax-coated, hormone-induced plum (assuming that botanically it is still a plum) at a
chain supermarket may sit on the shelf for weeks without rotting. But flavor, size, and
health-wise, a natural, from-the-orchard-to-your-table fruit is exponentially more
appealing. So unlike toys, cars, or homes, durability is not necessarily an indication of
success in the constitutional context. What is more, even an above average endurance of
a given constitutional order may not necessarily reflect a perfect design or a nirvana-like
ultimate harmony as much as it may reflect path-dependence factors, as well as the
constellations of power that are conducive to its endurance and are able to block calls for
change.
A more substantive way to define and measure the "success" of a given
constitutional design is by its ability to deliver, independently or in association with
other factors, the substantive goods it purports to advance. So, for example, an empirical
assessment of the actual contribution of federalism and proportional representation on
mitigating strife in multi-ethnic polities, suggests that both "highly touted solutions to
ethnic divisions," have at best mixed effects.27 Or, to pick another example, while active
judicial review is regarded by the emerging global consensus that both Melkinsburg and
Jackson explore, as the epicenter and sin-qua-non of any vibrant democratic political
system, very few if any of the top twelve countries in the comprehensive Democracy
Index conducted by The Economist sport a long tradition of American-style written
constitutionalism, high-voltage judicial review, or a culturally engrained constitutional
27.

Zachary Elkins & John Sides, Can Institutions Build Unity in Multiethnic States? 101 Am. Pol. Sci.

Rev. 693 (2007).
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sanctity. 28 And judicial interpretation of constitutional provisions, an aspect that
Melkinsburg do not address in this book, seems to matter a great deal in determining a
given constitution's "success" as courts strive to translate broad constitutional provisions
into practical guidelines for public life. In short, unlike most other large-scale "design
sciences" (e.g., urban planning or macroeconomic policy making) where the correlation
between the stated intentions at the design stage and actual, on-the-ground delivery is
seldom perfect but is often quite significant, when it comes to constitutions, that
correlation may be notably more modest than is commonly thought. 2 9 As Elkins and
Ginsburg readily admit in another piece of theirs, "[c]onstitutional design processes are
loaded with expectations about endurance, efficacy, the resolution of conflicts, and
political reconstruction . . . In the real world, however, most constitutions fail." 30
While the Melkinsburg and Jackson books differ in their approach to comparative
inquiry, a key common denominator is their cosmopolitan outlook and corresponding
treatment of constitutions and constitutionalism as universal phenomena. An often-cited
hurdle in advancing a general theory in comparative constitutional law is the potential
oversight of the specific institutional, political, and doctrinal context within which laws
evolve and function. Without attention to such contextual details, important nuances and
idiosyncrasies are easily lost. 3 1 There is, no doubt, some truth in the contextualist
concern, for there are indeed significant differences in the constitutional history, law, and
jurisprudence of countries worldwide. Having said that, the contextualist concern seems
to provide an all too easy excuse for not engaging in general theory building. Very few
of the supposedly "contextualist" works on the spread of constitutional review provide
distinctly "thicker descriptions" than Vicki Jackson's take on the subject. More
importantly, even social anthropology - arguably the most "contextual" and
"hermeneutic" discipline in the social sciences - attempts to produce generalizable
insights regarding human development and behavior that are based on, but ultimately go
beyond, detailed ethnographies.
One of my favorite examples here is Richard Lee's meticulous ethnographic work
on patterns of food gathering and consumption among the !Kung San in the Kalahari. 32
His work led to the expansion of the "homo-economicus" thesis to the least likely of
settings, and ultimately to a paradigm shift in our understanding of the economic and
political organization of hunter-gatherer societies. 33 Besides, there seems to be a notable
28. The Democracy Index conducted by The Economist focuses on five general categories of democracy:
electoral process and pluralism, civil liberties, functioning of government, political participation, and political
culture. Regimes are assigned a score on a zero to ten scale, where ten is the closest a country can get to full
democracy. According to Democracy Index 2009, North Korea scored the lowest with 0.86, while Sweden
scored a total of 9.88 (the highest result). The rest of the top dozen countries include Norway, Iceland, the
Netherlands, Denmark, Finland, New Zealand, Switzerland, Luxemburg, Australia, Canada, and Ireland. The
United States was ranked eighteenth with a score of 8.22. 29.Ran Hirschl, The "Design Sciences " and
Constitutional "Success", 87 Tex. L. Rev. 1339 (2009).
29. Ran Hirschl, The "Design Sciences" and Constitutional "Success ", 87 Tex. L. Rev. 1339 (2009).
30. Tom Ginsburg, Zachary Elkins & Justin Blount, Does the Process of Constitution-Making Matter? 5

Annual Rev. L. & Soc. Sci. 201, 219 (2009).
31. This is, in a nutshell, the argument advanced by Mark Tushnet in his Interpreting Constitutions
Comparatively:Some CautionaryNotes, with Reference to Affirmative Action, 36 Conn. L. Rev. 649 (2004).
32. See e.g. Richard B. Lee, The !Kung San: Men, Women, and Work in a ForagingSociety (Cambridge U.

Press 1979).
33. See generally id
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difference between the significance of context when one studies the transition from
childhood to adolescence in early twentieth-century New Guinea (Margaret Mead),
patterns of reciprocity in remote Melanesian islands (Bronislaw Malinowski), or magic
rituals among the Nuer of southern Sudan (E. E. Evans-Pritchard) - to name but three
ethnographic classics - and the much more modest significance of context when one
studies pervasive phenomena such as the mass media, air traffic, professional sports,
scientific discoveries, or modem constitutionalism. In other words, the more universal
and widespread certain norms and practices become - the astounding convergence
worldwide toward constitutional supremacy and judicial review would be a good
example here - the less effective or significant are the contextualist concerns.
Constitutionalization certainly is universal and widespread by any quantitative or
qualitative measure. Given other broad economic, technological, and cultural
convergence processes, let alone the dramatically improved availability of, and access to
comparative constitutional jurisprudence, jurisprudential cross-fertilization, and the
globalization of constitutional law more generally, seem inevitable. 34 However
idiosyncratic or rooted in local traditions and practices a given polity's constitutional law
may be, it is unavoidably open to liberalizing global influences. In a transnational age,
even bastions of insular parochialism, let alone leading members of the Western world,
cannot avoid certain degrees of international impact. While each instance of
constitutionalism is surely unique or idiosyncratic in many respects, it is the development
and substantiation of a core common element or a general principle that can be applied to
many or all of these examples that make for a great scientific discovery. To draw an
analogy with linguistics, while every language or dialect is distinctive in many ways,
there is nonetheless the possibility that there are common elements among many or all of
them, as proposed in Noam Chomsky's renowned theory of "generative grammar."
Aspiring to trace broad patterns or formulate such general rules, applicable across
contexts, is arguably one of the meta-goals of modern scientific inquiry. The Jackson and
Melkinsburg books, each in its own captivating way, are to be loudly applauded for
attempting to accomplish precisely that.

34. See Mark Tushnet, The Inevitable Globalizationof ConstitutionalLaw, 49 Va. J. Intl. L. 985 (2009).

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol45/iss4/19

10

